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‘Little England Beats Great Britain’: 







Italy is one of the core founding members countries of the European 
Economic Community (EEC), along with Belgium, France, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and the then West Germany; and, for most of its post-
Second World War history, has been a strong supporter of the 
European unification project. In the last two decades, however, with the 
rise of new political formations such as the Lega Nord, the entrance into 
the political arena of Silvio Berlusconi, and more recently with the estab- 
lishment of the Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Stars Movement), henceforth 
M5S, there has been a marked change and anti-European sentiments 
have become more widespread in the political culture as a whole. This 
in turn has affected media coverage of European Union (EU) affairs and 
has steered the views of the Italian public towards a more negative read- 
ing of the European unification project. Other factors have also played a 
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role in the change, especially monetary union, introduced in 2002, and 
the ‘uncontrolled’ exchange rate that resulted in twofold increases in the 
prices of goods and services (of course this was a national problem rather 
than a European one, as the same problem did not arise in quite the same 
way in the other countries which introduced the euro). 
The EU referendum 2016 followed hard on the heels of the 
December 2016 Italian referendum on constitutional reform promoted 
by the then Prime Minister Matteo Renzi of the centre-left Partito 
Democratico (Democratic Party). That referendum had been called to 
introduce a reform of the Italian constitution and, while it was a complex 
process which cannot be described in detail here, suffice it to say that it 
was opposed both by the right and some of the left-wing political forces 
in Italy. In one of its prime aims, which was to abolish the second house 
(The Senate), it was generally perceived by constitutionalists, as well as 
the more informed general public, as a move to concentrate powers in 
the first house (La Camera, or Chamber of Deputies) and the Prime 
Minister’s hands. In the event, Renzi lost (it was a simple yes/no referen- 
dum), but this referendum was also largely reported as a verdict on the 
EU and its future by social media (the favoured medium of communi- 
cation of M5S) as well as by much of the centre-right press; these media 
capitalized on the ‘No’ to the reform and somewhat arbitrarily circulated 
the idea that Italy was now on course to call a referendum on member- 
ship of the EU in the same way as the United Kingdom (UK) has done. 
Alongside this, on the left of the political spectrum, there was also a call 
to reform the democratic process within the EU in order to make it 
more accountable to the people of the individual countries and to com- 
bat policies of austerity, along the lines of movements such as European 
Alternatives (https://ea10.eu/it/) or DiEM25 (https://diem25.org/). 
The following chapter examining Italian media coverage of the British 
EU referendum in 2016 confirms that Italy is still a stronger supporter of 
the EU than a country like the UK, albeit with some qualifications about 
the nature of its democratic processes and neoliberal economic policies, 
but not quite in the same measure as when I analysed media coverage of 
the Maastricht summit (Cere 2001). 
 
from maastricht to ‘brexit’ 
Since its establishment with the Maastricht Treaty signed in February 1992 
(the summit took place on 9–10 December 1991), the EU has forged ahead 
with many of its commitments, from the establishment of the Schengen 
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Agreement, which abolished internal borders between the signatory countries 
(currently 26), to the introduction of the eurozone in 1999, followed by the 
currency itself on 1 January 2002 (currently 19 countries) and the gradual 
enlargement to include countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The EU cur- 
rently has 28 members, soon to be 27 with the departure of the UK. 
The UK, ever since it joined in 1973, has been a ‘reluctant partner’; 
this was probably most visible during the Thatcher Government, with its 
endless demands for rebates to the UK’s economic contribution, still a 
key factor in 2016 during the Brexit (Britain’s exit from the EU) cam- 
paign. In 1991, I compared the UK and Italian media coverage of the 
Maastricht summit. In doing so, it not only confirmed the hypothesis 
that anti-European feelings were circulated and reinforced regularly in 
news broadcasts across all the main UK terrestrial channels (then BBC, 
ITV and Channel 4), but also that these were pitted against a ‘mythi- 
cal’ national unity, which was again debunked in the 2016 EU referen- 
dum results with Scotland and Northern Ireland voting for remaining in 
Europe. This theme of internal division, which I will discuss below, was 
definitely taken up in Italian media coverage. 
As against this, Italian broadcast news coverage of the Maastricht 
summit (then provided by the three main public service channels, Rai1, 
Rai2 and Rai3) revealed total support for the Treaty and its outcome. 
In that study I had argued that the reasons behind this strong pro-Eu- 
ropean stance were based on the fact that Italy was a relatively young 
nation state and that, as argued by Paul Ginsborg (1994: 643–644), it 
had undergone a process of ‘nazionalizzazione debole’ (weak national 
identity formation) and hence looked to Europe for its identity. Another 
argument was tied to the fact that Italy could only function properly as a 
state if it looked to a supra-national body like the EU (this is still the case 
today). Fast forward 25 years, and 28 countries later: the unquestioning 
Europeanism long embedded in Italian political culture and media insti- 
tutions alike has undergone some important transformations without, 
however, entirely changing the generally pro-European stance. This will 
become evident in the analysis below, which examines the media cover- 
age of the UK’s 2016 EU referendum and the Brexit result. 
 
the rise of PoPulism: ‘anti-Politics’ made in italy 
Right-wing populism is on the rise and the Brexit campaign was a good 
example of this with its insistence on immigration, tightening of bor- 
ders, national control and presumed anti-politics, normally dressed up 
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as criticism of the ruling elite (the paradox of course is that the leaders 
of anti-politics themselves emerge from those same elites). This is a phe- 
nomenon that has not been exclusive to European countries, as we have 
seen with the election of Trump in 2016, the ongoing rule in Russia of 
Putin and more recently the referendum victory of Erdoğan in Turkey, 
three leaders who undoubtedly make a perfect ideological fit with politi- 
cal populism. In Italy, in recent years we have seen this phenomenon fully 
characterized by figures and parties like Umberto Bossi and his Northern 
League, and Silvio Berlusconi and his party, formerly Forza Italia (also 
a national football slogan loosely translatable as ‘Go on Italy’) and now 
II Popolo della libertà (The People of Freedom) (Ruzza and Balbo 
2013). The ‘anti-politics’ of the Italian populist parties has always had an 
anti-European core which, however, only properly found support after 
the financial crisis and the dire economic effects of this on all European 
nations, but especially the Mediterranean countries, Italy included. 
In 2013, in the same vein of anti-politics, the organization led by 
the political satirist/comedian Beppe Grillo and his M5S movement ran 
in the national elections and won an unprecedented share of the vote, 
over 25% and nine million votes. This new political formation is the lat- 
est development in a political culture which has seen enormous transfor- 
mations in political support for traditional centre and centre-left parties 
caused by the upheaval of the corruption scandals of the 1980s and early 
1990s. These have resulted either in the parties’ restructuring or in their 
complete demise, as was the case for the Christian Democratic Party 
which ruled Italy for most of the post-war years right up to the 1980s, 
and the smaller but influential Socialist Party which governed in coali- 
tion, alongside many other parties, right up to the Tangentopoli (kick- 
backs) trials of the early 1990s. These parties and many others of the 
centre and centre-left were significant players in Italy’s relationship with 
the European unification project as they were largely supportive as well 
as promoters of a federalist idea of Europe. 
Many studies have recently concentrated on the phenomenon of pop- 
ulism, although none has dealt in particular with its relationship to the 
EU. What has become evident, however, from the media post-Brexit,  
is that most countries have now substantial political populist elements, 
which have made their core objective the withdrawal of their countries 
from the EU. These have also sought reinforcement from one another 
in the run-up to their national elections and referendums, including 
Brexit. Photo opportunities have been relayed across the media involving 
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Nigel Farage, Beppe Grillo, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini (the current 
Northern League leader) and Geert Wilders, in an unprecedented show 
of anti-European ‘solidarity’ (France’s presidential elections in May 2017 
were the latest of such tests with Marine Le Pen of the Front National 
running as a candidate). 
Since the introduction of the neologism made up of the initial letters 
of ‘Britain’ and the word ‘exit’, many countries have followed suit and 
much European media coverage has adopted this linguistic shorthand 
to indicate the trend fuelled by right-wing populist parties to call for 
referendums to decide about membership of the EU. Italy is no excep- 
tion and the word ‘Italexit’ has appeared in many articles covering the 
implications of Brexit for Italian anti-European parties, but the political 
picture is far more complicated in Italy as contradictory messages about 
Europe have circulated especially since the more recent emergence of the 
political formation M5S. 
 
the italian Press and the eu referendum 2016 
Italy does not have a tabloid press and celebrity, entertainment and life- 
style news remain largely consigned to weeklies and monthlies. The only 
available dailies which are exclusively leisure-oriented are the sport papers 
which, on Mondays (following the weekend sports fixtures), exceed the 
readership of most of the national newspapers. It is also the case that 
newspaper readership is low compared to other European countries; 
2017 figures from the Federazione Italiana Editori Giornali (FIEG) of 
58 papers, most of them regional (reflecting the continuing regional 
character of Italian political culture), reveal a readership of over 4 million 
from a total population of just over 60 million, with the paper copies 
still having a much larger readership than the digital versions, in spite 
of the increased digitization of Italian society and with nearly 40 million 
active Internet users (Soluzione Group 2017). It is, however, important 
to consider that the main national titles, which have a combined read- 
ership of nearly half of the above figure, are information-heavy papers 
with politics, national and international, heading the selection of news, a 
trend that can be traced back to the origins of the press in Italy following 
national unification in 1861 (Sorrentino 1995: 27). 
The two national papers with the largest readership are Il Corriere 
della Sera and La Repubblica, respectively of the centre and centre-left  
of the political spectrum. The third largest is La Stampa, a Turin-based 
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paper with a national distribution, still majority-owned by the Agnelli 
family (founder of the FIAT car manufacturing company), also aligned to 
the political centre. There are several other papers, with a much smaller 
readership, across the entire political spectrum from left to right; and 
only one newspaper still aligned to a political party, L’Unità, formerly 
the organ of the Italian Communist Party founded by Antonio Gramsci 
in1924, now known as the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party). 
The British referendum received wide coverage across all the daily 
press in Italy, as well as being the main news item on the front page of 
all of them the day after the result was announced. The main frame for 
all the centre, centre-left and left-wing papers was one of support for the 
Remain camp; however, within these there were some important differ- 
ences in the argumentation and reasons for their support. The right-wing 
press frame was predictably supportive of the Brexit camp, but again with 
some distinctions among different titles. 
Similarly, a content analysis of three major newspapers in 13 European 
countries, along with Russia and the USA, undertaken by the European 
Journalism Observatory in the week that followed the referendum, found 
that the majority of the press analysed was critical of the UK’s vote to leave 
the EU, with the exception of Russia. In the particular case of Italy, a sub- 
stantive sample of 249 articles was considered from the two major papers 
mentioned above (Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica) and also  
from the right-wing paper Il Giornale (owned by Berlusconi’s media and 
publishing companies, respectively Fininvest and Mondadori). As in my 
qualitative analysis of Italian coverage of Brexit (see immediately below), 
Italy was found to be in line with most of the European press in its pro- 
Remain trend, with the exception of Berlusconi’s paper, which the study 
described as having some of ‘the most enthusiastic pro-Brexit coverage’ 
(European Journalism Observatory 2017). This is not surprising given the 
ownership of the paper and the anti-European stance taken by the various 
coalition governments formed by Berlusconi’s party with either the Lega 
Nord and/or the former Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance) in the last 
twenty years, right up to his Government which ended in 2011. 
In my own analysis of the press coverage of the EU referendum 2016, 
I picked out three dominant themes: the economic fallout, with related 
articles about the role of the European Central Bank (ECB); immigra- 
tion and the openly racist campaign of the Leave camp, including exten- 
sive coverage of the killing of MP Jo Cox; and populism and its electoral 
base in the UK and the division in the vote. 
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the economic imPact of ‘brexit’ 
Many articles in the Italian papers concentrated on the economic impact 
of the referendum in relation to the UK, Italy the EU and even interna- 
tional relations. On 24 June, the day immediately after the referendum 
and the victory of the Brexit campaign, the markets’ negative response 
was covered in all the papers, left and right, albeit with different con- 
cerns. In the same vein, sterling’s immediate loss of 10% of its value 
against the euro was also mentioned across all the papers. Metaphors of 
doom abounded in the coverage of the economic implications of Brexit 
as well as in other areas of analysis, especially on the political and eco- 
nomic future of the EU as a whole. 
La Repubblica dedicated many articles to the economic fallout of the 
UK referendum, concentrating on the effects of the fall in value of ster- 
ling against the euro but also how the latter was itself under pressure 
as a result of this outcome, and how the ECB was dealing with this cri- 
sis. Alongside its national editions, this newspaper has ten local sections 
dependent on regional distribution in Bari, Bologna, Firenze, Genova, 
Milano, Napoli, Palermo, Parma, Roma and Torino. These concentrated 
on questions relating to the effects on the local economy, one example 
being an article from the Emilia Romagna section titled ‘Brexit, Emilia, 
all the fears regarding exports’ (Anon, La Repubblica, 26 June 2016a); 
London is one of the region’s biggest markets, with product sales there 
worth about €3.5 billion. This type of coverage was replicated, however, 
in all the various regions covered, from Sicily to Piedmont. 
Il Corriere della Sera and La Stampa in particular also carried many arti- 
cles on the financial markets post-referendum with discussions about its 
effect on the Milan Stock Exchange; similar language was used across the 
two papers, with the word ‘panic’ in all the titles and subtitles. Right-wing 
papers like Libero and Il Giornale adopted similar titles (for example, ‘Stock 
Exchanges slump’ [Editorial, Il Giornale, 24 June 2016a]), but the analysis 
of the economic outcome in both papers, especially in Libero, veered towards 
a connection with and a prediction about potential future developments, 
namely requests for similar referendums on the part of many countries in 
Europe, the total suggested in the title was 32, though this clearly includes 
some of the candidates in line to join (Editorial, Libero, 24 June 2016b). 
L’Unità, two days after the referendum, dedicated its first 15 pages 
to the British referendum with extensive coverage of many related 
issues. Its front page on 25 June (see figure), with its ‘Italianate’ English 
title ‘Disintegration Day’, also carried a subtitle about the collapse of 
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the markets, with indexes down in all the financial centres of Europe, 
coupled with a political comment about ‘secessionist winds’, includ- 
ing an interview with David Martin, the leader of the Scottish Labour 
MEPs in the European Parliament, on page five. The contextualiza- 
tion of the economic impact of Brexit received further in-depth cover- 
age in an interview with the French economist Jean-Paul Fitoussi: ‘It’s 
a no to austerity. If the EU does not change, soon other Brexits’ (De 
Giovannangeli, L’Unità, 25 June 2016). In another economics-related 
article in L’Unità, there was also a mention of the worst collapse in the 
value of sterling since Black Wednesday in 1992. This kind of economic 
contextualization is typical of the left-wing press in Italy. 
 
‘brexit’ and immigration 
Immigration was the dominant theme of the Leave campaign in Britain 
and the openly xenophobic campaign of the conservative press, both 
tabloids and broadsheets, was the target of many critical articles in the 
centre-left and left-wing press in Italy in the run-up to the referendum. 
With the results in, and the victory of the Brexit vote confirmed, discus- 
sion in the press changed to the theme of the status of immigrants in 
the UK and, conversely, many articles also mentioned the status of UK 
nationals in the EU and in Italy. Significantly, I saw more articles on the 
implications for UK nationals post-referendum in the Italian press than 
in the British press (from a sample of all the British and Italian papers on 
25 June 2016, two days after the referendum). On this day La Stampa, 
besides carrying more than one article with apocalyptic titles and sub- 
titles (‘Brexit, in 24 hours the world has changed’; ‘Brexit, now facing 
the risk of a shock’ [Molinari, La Stampa, 24 June 2016]), ran articles 
about immigrants’ fear of having to leave London (the metropolitan- 
centred view of immigration is obvious here as if all immigrants resided 
in London) and conversely UK citizens having to leave the EU, and top- 
ics relating to pensions and work and visa status for both groups: ‘Many 
foreigners fear having to leave London and many British people having 
to leave the EU’ (Anon, La Stampa, 24 June 2016b). 
A large part of the coverage in the press, but also a theme within 
the talk show and broadcast news analysed below, concentrated on the 
effects of Brexit on Italian immigrants in the UK. The Italian Iniziative 
e studi sulla multietnicità (ISMU Foundation) has traced migration 
flows into Italy over the last two decades, its most recent report showing 
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that the immigrant population has grown from 750,000 to 5 million, 
meaning that Italy has gone from being an emigration to an immigra- 
tion country (Cesareo 2014). Despite this, there still remains a substan- 
tial population drain, especially among the younger generation. A report 
from the Migrantes Foundation for 2015 tells us that there is still a con- 
stant trickle, if not a flow as in previous emigration waves (Italy, at least 
right up to the late 1960s, was still exporting manual labour migrants to 
mainly European countries, principally Belgium, Germany and France): 
107,000 Italians, with the largest proportion in the 18–34 year range, 
many of them professionals, have left the country for European desti- 
nations, the highest number going to Germany, followed by the UK, 
Switzerland and France (Huffington Post 2016). Another important 
element of this report is a change in the provenance of the Italian emi- 
grants: although the majority still originate from the South of Italy, 
increasingly there are also substantial numbers from the industrialized 
North. 
Il Giornale, which, as mentioned in the study above, was predomi- 
nantly pro-Brexit, paradoxically relayed a news item carried on social 
media about an Italian waiter being told to go home and give up       
his job to a British person: ‘Now, Italian, you can go home so that a 
British person can take your place’ (Nenzi, Il Giornale, 24 June 2016). 
He was emphatically described as the ‘first victim of Brexit’ (24 June 
2016). Very little is verifiable about this story, which was taken from a 
Facebook site. This is one of the few examples which follow a more ‘tab- 
loid’ logic in reporting the consequences of Brexit on Italian immigrants. 
La Repubblica, in a more serious discussion in its Palermo edition, also 
covered the immigration question, specifically in relation to Sicily, allud- 
ing to ‘Those twenty thousand Sicilians “prisoners” of Brexit’ who, the 
article argues, ‘feel somewhat disoriented’ as to what the future holds 
(Giorgianni, La Repubblica, 25 June 2016). 
 
PoPulism, anti-Politics’ and the brexit voter 
The left-wing press concentrated many articles on the reasons why Brexit 
won in the Labour heartlands. The three left-leaning newspapers, La 
Repubblica, Il Manifesto and L’Unità, dedicated  a  number  of  articles 
to a more serious analysis of the reasons for the working-class vote for 
Brexit. The themes ranged across the rise of the right, populist politics 
and the economic consequences of neoliberal ideology. These were also 
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linked to a shared trajectory in Italy where the working-class vote has 
partially moved away from left-wing parties towards populist organiza- 
tions already discussed above such as the Northern League and M5S. 
Il Manifesto published articles in translation by various English com- 
mentators. One by Karel Williams, ‘Why the working class has voted 
leave’ (1 July 2016), delves in-depth into the socio-economic reasons for 
the working-class vote for Brexit; Williams insists on the paradoxical case 
of the Brexit slogan of taking back control, when in reality working-class 
people have already lost control of their lives. This kind of in-depth class 
analysis is rarely available in the press in the UK; granted, Il Manifesto 
is not a large circulation newspaper but it is not minuscule either at 
nearly 40,000 copies (by way of comparison, such a circulation is four 
times larger than the British Communist Party paper, the Morning Star). 
Many other articles in Il Manifesto were serious pieces of journalism, 
where connections were made between populist politics and the vote for 
Brexit. In particular, it gave a great deal of space to the different posi- 
tions within the different countries of the UK. Two examples, one before 
the referendum and one after, underline this: ‘Belfast for Remain, nearly’ 
(Terrinoi, Il Manifesto, 21 June 2016); ‘Brexit divides the UK’ (Clausi,   
Il Manifesto, 26 June 2016). The second article included an in-depth 
discussion about the meeting that took place between Theresa May and 
the leaders of Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, especially about 
their joint opposition to a hard Brexit. 
This discussion was also taken up in articles about the death of the 
MP Jo Cox, which again received extensive coverage in the Italian press 
as well as on television. In the article ‘Where are you going, England?’ 
(Beasdale, Il Manifesto, 25 June 2016), consideration was given to the 
rise of extreme right-wing ideologies and how they are appropriated by 
disturbed individuals. However, as I have seen in other such coverage, 
the Italian press tends to favour political explanations over psychological 
ones (Cere et al. 2016). 
In a similar vein, many articles in L’Unità discussed the new ‘anti- 
politics’ of populism, concentrating particularly on its grass-roots sup- 
port in Italy with a rather extravagant title on 25 June, ‘Our home-grown 
euro jackals led by Grillo’s somersaults’, although the article itself offers 
a serious analysis of the impossibility under present Italian constitutional 
rules of calling a referendum of the kind called in the UK. M5S was dis- 
cussed, along with its many contradictory messages about staying in or 
leaving Europe, as well as the Lega Nord and yet another new right-wing 
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formation, Polo Sovranista (Pro-sovereignty Bloc), which incorporates 
La Destra (The Right) and Azione Nazionale (all remnants of fascist 
parties), which are openly anti-European. La Repubblica and Il Fatto 
Quotidiano also published a number of articles before and after Brexit 
about the populist trajectory of contemporary politics, especially in rela- 
tion to home-grown movements like the Northern League and M5S.  
(Il Fatto Quotidiano is a relatively new left-leaning daily established in 
2009, whose current editor, Marco Travaglio, has written extensively on 
corruption scandals in Italy, especially in relation to Berlusconi.) 
 
Porta  a Porta Political talk show: 
the ‘english’ myth extended 
On 24 June, all television news broadcasts on the Rai (Radiotelevisione 
italiana) public-service channels had as their first item the results of the 
Brexit referendum. Similarly, the commercial channels (Berlusconi’s 
three channels and LA7) had extensive news coverage of the Brexit result 
and its implications. In terms of ‘election specials’, Rai1 offered Porta  
a Porta (Door to Door), a weekly fixture in its schedule, on the night   
of the referendum (I will discuss this in more detail below), while Rai3 
broadcast a TG 3 speciale Brexit on the following night (24 June 2016). 
Also, on the 24 June, the independent commercial channel LA7 dedi- 
cated a special programme to coverage of the results of the referendum. 
There is no space in this chapter to discuss all these ‘specials’ in detail, 
but they were very much in line with the rest of the press in Italy, favour- 
ing the Remain argument. The third channel of the Italian public-service 
broadcaster, Rai3, which produces the TG 3 newscasts, has a left-leaning 
political allegiance, unlike Rai1. 
Nearly 2 million Italian viewers watched the political talk show Porta 
a Porta on the evening of the UK’s EU referendum with the title La 
lunga notte di Brexit (The long night of Brexit). This programme is a 
long-standing feature of Rai1’s schedule, led by its equally long-standing 
conservative host Bruno Vespa. It was an extended programme that, as 
the title suggests, broadcast well into the night, lasting over three hours 
and ending just before the final result, which proved wrong the ongo- 
ing evening predictions of a victory for the Remain vote (blown up in 
percentages as part of the visual background to the show). One of the 
main characteristics of the programme was its usually long list of guests 
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consisting of politicians and various social actors from across the politi- 
cal spectrum. On this occasion, guests also came from the economic and 
media worlds. 
I have chosen to discuss Porta a Porta here as it runs ‘against the 
grain’ of Italian coverage of the UK’s EU referendum and is a perfect 
illustration of ‘performing talk’ (Haarman 1999: 1), a mix of politics 
and entertainment, and the nearest thing to ‘tabloidization’ of politics in 
Italy. The other reason for looking at this political talk show in particular 
is that it typifies a peculiarly Italian cultural conception of the UK, based 
on the myth that the UK (read England) is a superior country (and 
friendly to Italy). Micossi and Perissich (2016) have recently argued that 
Italy has always been a supporter of UK membership of the European 
project (unlike the French). They also added that this support is moti- 
vated by two factors: first, ‘a long tradition of friendship that, with the 
exception of the Second World War, goes back to the UK’s support for 
the Risorgimento’; and second, somewhat more instrumentally, ‘that Italy 
hoped that the UK could provide a welcome balance to the dominance 
of the Franco-German partnership’ (2016: 2). Needless to say, successive 
British governments have not paid much attention to Italy’s sympathy 
and support: ‘Despite several attempts on the Italian side, this strategy 
has always led to disappointment; Britain, despite some polite noises, 
never really took any notice’ (ibid.: 2). 
This show is very distant from the journalistic culture which produced 
the Brexit coverage discussed above in the press; nonetheless, sections of 
the show followed some of the same themes: for example, on the topic 
of immigration, the economic impact, the death of the MP Jo Cox, the 
‘reluctant’ European partner, and somewhat surprisingly, a heated dis- 
cussion about the internal conflict within the Conservative Party. The 
treatment, however, was very different, partly due to the nature of the 
interaction between political guests from opposing parties (ranging from 
members of the leading party in the present Coalition Government 
[Partito Democratico] to a number of representatives from the opposi- 
tion), as well as leading figures from the world of business, finance and 
academia. Also different was the organisation of disagreements, or rather 
the lack of it: the disregard of turn taking and ‘extended disagreement 
sequences’ (Diani 1999: 149) which often strayed from the 2016 EU 
referendum itself and into the ongoing problems of Italian governance 
(with a particularly excruciating sycophantic comment about the health 
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of Berlusconi by a panel member from his party, Renato Brunetta, with 
no action by the host to stop it). 
The myth-making exercise which circulates in Italian culture about 
the UK and England in particular alluded to above (in Italy as else- 
where, these two terms often stand as one and the same, without dis- 
tinction, much to the chagrin of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) 
was interspersed with sections of talk and external report items: for 
example, one of the reporters was stationed in an East London pizze- 
ria. These various light ‘breaks’ incorporated performances by a pipe 
band in tartan uniforms (it was in actual fact a Roman pipe band); a 
lookalike Beatles band (whose music was rather good even if the wigs 
weren’t) followed by the ‘Beatles story’, a visual item ‘studded’ with 
archival material from the 1960s; a dubious account of the role of 
Shakespeare in British culture and the celebration of the fourth cente- 
nary of his death falling precisely in the year of the referendum, albeit 
with a humorous comment about the indecisiveness of one the famous 
lines in Hamlet: ‘to be or not to be […] in Europe’. It all came across as 
rather stereotypical and incongruous and with a slightly self-demeaning 
and nostalgic note of Italy ‘losing’ this special, original and superior 
friend as well as a partner member of the EU. Porta a Porta fits rather 
neatly into the categories that Dahlgren introduced as ‘Newer [TV] for- 
mats’ and especially the third category, that of ‘infotainment’ (1995: 
54–55); ultimately it fell short of communicating an informed message 
about the political and economic implications of Brexit for the UK, 
Europe or Italy. 
 
conclusion 
The Italian title of this chapter ‘Little England Beats Great Britain’ 
(Severgnini, Il Corriere della  Sera,  24  June  2016)  is  a  reference  to  
the way people of the different nations within the  UK  voted,  but 
also, less openly, it is suggestive of some ‘inward-looking’ stances evi- 
dent in parts of England and Wales (England and Wales voted to leave 
the EU, whereas Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain). It 
was penned by Il Corriere della Sera’s London correspondent, Beppe 
Severgnini, inside the Reform Club, (named after the Great Reform 
Act of 1832 which modified the electoral system to grant the vote to 
small landowners, tenant farmers, shopkeepers and all male property 
owners, while still of course excluding working men [women were to 
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wait far longer for the vote]) where he was based along with other for- 
eign correspondents on the ground. The article, unequivocally pro- 
Remain, was couched in a discussion about an institution (the Club) 
and its building, which purports to represent the best of Britain: 
democracy, progressive liberal values and tolerance. Counter to that 
was what Severgnini described as the perfida (perfidious, perhaps better 
translated as vicious) campaign of the Leave side about immigrants. He 
went on to argue that the UK is no longer a superpower, but rather a 
middle-sized power that knows how to do some things well, but clearly 
not others, such as calling this referendum: a very different tone to the 
one described above in the talk show. 
Alongside the lesson in history and architecture about the Reform 
Club, which did not appear directly relevant, the overall message was 
that the UK was not so much leaving, as ‘running away […] slamming 
the door behind it’ (Severgnini, Il Corriere della Sera, 24 June 2016). A 
similar title, ‘La Piccola Inghilterra’ (Little England), also appeared on 
the front page of L’Unità a couple of days later on 26 June 2016, and   
in the following article references were made to the isolationism and 
xenophobic tendencies of Little England (Boldrini, l’Unità, 26 June 
2016). 
Two days after the UK’s EU referendum an opinion poll asked 
Italians whether they still trusted the EU and the figure was below 40% 
compared to the earlier one in 2010 of 55%. Nonetheless, in a poll 
which asked the more specific question of whether to stay in or withdraw 
from the EU, the results were somewhat different: 53% were in favour 
of staying in and 39% wanted to leave, the rest being don’t knows. The 
results perhaps reflected the Machiavellian character of the opinion poll: 
the 55% total was reached with two qualifications to the question: one, 
which stated that is better to stay in as Italy is weaker in comparison 
to the UK (24%); and two, it is more helpful to stay in for Italy (29%) 
(Risso, L’Unità, 26 June 2016). The majority of the press  coverage 
seems not to reflect the first figure above of 40% in its predominant sup- 
port for Remain, perhaps underlining the fact that the press is only read 
by a small section of the population. Overall the coverage was serious, 
although somewhat apocalyptic in tone. On the other hand, the political 
talk show resorted to a form of political and cultural populism, which 
left unclear many issues regarding how and why the British people voted 
against what many see as their own interests. 
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